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Abstract Cloud computing is a promising next-generation 
computing paradigm that offers significant economic 
benefits to both commercial and public entities. 
Furthermore, cloud computing provides accessibility, 
simplicity, and portability for its customers. Due to the 
unique combination of characteristics that cloud 
computing introduces (including on-demand self-service, 
broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity, 
and measured service), digital investigations face various 
technical, legal, and organizational challenges to keep up 
with current developments in the field of cloud 
computing. There are a wide variety of issues that need to 
be resolved in order to perform a proper digital 
investigation in the cloud environment. This paper 
examines the challenges in cloud forensics that are 
identified in the current research literature, alongside 
exploring the existing proposals and technical solutions 
addressed in the respective research. The open problems 
that need further effort are highlighted. As a result of the 
analysis of literature, it is found that it would be difficult, 
if not impossible, to perform an investigation and 
discovery in the cloud environment without relying on 
cloud service providers (CSPs). Therefore, dependence on 
the cloud service providers (CSPs) is ranked as the 
greatest challenge when investigators need to acquire 
evidence in a timely yet forensic manner from cloud 
systems. Thus, a fully independent model requires no 
intervention or cooperation from the cloud provider is 
proposed. This model provides a different approach to a 
Forensic Acquisition and Analysis System (FAAS) in an 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) model. FAAS seeks to 
provide a richer and more complete set of admissible 
evidence than what current CSPs provide, with no 
requirement for CSP involvement or modification to the 
CSP’s underlying architecture. 
Keywords: Cloud computing · Digital forensics · Cloud 
forensic challenges · Cloud forensic solutions · Forensic 
acquisition · Forensic analysis 
 
S. Alqahtany, N. Clarke, and S. Furnell 
Saad.alqahtany@plymouth.ac.uk 
Centre for Security, Communications and Network Research 
Plymouth University, Plymouth, UK 
Christoph Reich 
Information and Media Centre  
Hochschule Furtwangen University 
Furtwangen, Germany 
1 Introduction 
In the past few years, cloud computing has become an 
attractive solution for many Internet users and 
organizations [1]. Cloud computing offers significant 
economic benefits to users by providing a highly scalable 
infrastructure, pay-as-you-go service at low cost, and on-
demand computing. Nonetheless, the same technology 
also poses a number of threats, including criminal 
exploitation, which can leave little evidence behind and 
enable the carrying out of malicious activities with ease. 
For example, cybercriminals are utilizing existing cloud 
services as their infrastructure to target their victims. In 
2013, a Chinese gang exploited cloud file-hosting services 
and utilized Dropbox to distribute its malware in 
preparation for an initial stage of Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attacks [2].  
Indeed, the issues of security and privacy are listed as 
the top concern for cloud adoption [3],[4]. Thus, several 
enterprises look at cloud computing cautiously [5]. 
Critical public sectors including finance and healthcare 
are slowly coming round to the idea of entrusting its apps 
and data to the cloud. However, several approaches are 
integrated with cloud computing aiming at assessing the 
general security requirements for cloud adoption. Despite 
this, academics and industry are still at lookout point to 
find the applicable approaches to govern cloud computing 
adoption[3]. While security has frequently been an 
afterthought in new technologies such as the cloud, digital 
forensics has historically been an “after-after-thought” [6]. 
Due to the distributed nature and configuration of the 
cloud-computing infrastructure, investigators face several 
challenges when performing a digital investigation in the 
cloud environment. These challenges are novel and unique 
to the cloud and are not encountered in traditional digital 
systems. This is due to the unique combination of 
characteristics that cloud computing introduces, including 
on-demand self-service, broad network access, resource 
pooling, rapid elasticity, and measured service [7].  
According to a survey on cloud and electronic 
discovery (eDiscovery) disseminated to organizations that 
are using cloud-based solutions, 26% responded that they 
do not have an eDiscovery plan in place and 58% 
responded that they do not even know if a plan exists [8]. 
This means that in case of litigation and investigation, 
such organizations will be left scrambling in a reactive 
manner to collect information from the cloud, leading to 
greater cost [9]. In addition, little research has been 
conducted to investigate how digital investigations could 
 be performed in a forensically sound manner within the 
cloud domain [10]. 
The current methodologies, procedures, tools, and 
architectures are not designed to handle and assist digital 
forensics in cloud environments even though on-going 
and proactive investigations are becoming mandatory 
components for enterprises [11]. Therefore, with great 
confidence, it can be said that cloud forensic issues have 
become more and more problematic and solutions that can 
provide cloud forensics must be sought urgently. 
To date, researchers have mainly focused on the 
identification of the issues that digital forensic 
investigators face when performing a digital investigation 
within cloud-computing environments. The survey 
conducted by [28] which merely focused on cloud 
forensics, highlighted that 87% of respondents agreed that 
“Designing forensics architecture for the cloud” is the 
main research direction. 
 This paper conducts a review based on a number of 
scientific papers that were retrieved from well-known 
academic databases including ACM, IEEE Xplore, 
Springer, and ScienceDirect. Based on the outcome of the 
review, this paper identifies the major challenges, existing 
solutions, and open problems in the field of cloud 
forensics. Ultimately, a different approach to the forensic 
acquisition and analysis (FAAS) in an Infrastructure as a 
Service (IaaS) model is propounded, seeking to tackle the 
dependency on the CSP issue, which is considered as the 
main open problem in cloud forensics. 
The paper is organized as follows: section two 
examines cloud forensic problems and explores the 
current solutions in each stage of the digital investigation 
process including identification, preservation, collection, 
examination, analysis, and presentation. Then section 
three details the existing research solutions and highlights 
the open issues. The proposed model is then described in 
section four, and followed by a brief discussion of the 
model prior to the conclusions and future work. 
2 Cloud Forensics: Challenges and Solutions 
The evolution of cloud forensics is still in its infancy, 
although cloud computing has been utilized in the market 
for many years [12]. Depending on each of the cloud-
service models, which include the IaaS, Platform as a 
Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS) models, 
different issues can be encountered during a digital 
investigation process [13]. Several researches have 
warned that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
perform an investigation and discovery in the cloud 
environment without relying on cloud service providers 
(CSPs) [14],[15]. Nonetheless, several conceptual 
solutions have been proposed to overcome this difficulty. 
In general, a digital forensic process contains four main 
stages: identification, preservation and collection, 
examination and analysis, and presentation [11]. This 
section categorizes the cloud forensic issues according to 
these stages.  
2.1 Identification Stage  
The initial identification of the machine(s) wherein illegal 
activities could be carried out and a forensic investigation 
are required. Due to the dynamic nature of the cloud 
infrastructure, several obstacles that hinder the 
investigators undertaking this step exist: 
 Access to the evidence in logs 
It is a common understanding that the identification of 
evidence via various sources could be challenging within 
the cloud environment [16],[17],[18]. Indeed, for certain 
cases, investigators do not even know the location of the 
data due to the distributed nature of the cloud (i.e. data are 
distributed among many hosts in multiple data centers) 
[19]. The availability of system statutes and log files 
depends on the cloud-service model. It is not feasible in 
SaaS and PaaS models due to the limited access that the 
client has; whereas it is partly applicable in the IaaS 
model, as the client has access to the virtual machine 
(VM), which behaves like an actual machine [20].  
A number of tools and procedures which can be 
utilized to identify and then acquire digital evidence from 
the cloud have been proposed and developed [12]. 
Nonetheless, the majority of them have focused merely on 
accessing evidence in logs in order to trace details of past 
events.  
Zaferullah et al. proposed and developed a standard 
logging mechanism that ensures the generation and 
retention of logs along with a log-management system that 
collects and correlates logs [21]. Their approach was 
evaluated within a Eucalyptus cloud environment. 
Eucalyptus is an acronym for “Elastic Utility Computing 
Architecture for Linking Your Programs to Useful 
Systems.” It is a Linux-based open-source software 
architecture that implements efficiency-enhancing private 
and hybrid clouds within an enterprise’s existing IT 
infrastructure without modifying its configuration. 
Eucalyptus can also leverage a heterogeneous collection 
of virtualization technologies within a single cloud, to 
incorporate resources that have already been virtualized 
[22]. Monitoring and analyzing tools (e.g. Snort, Syslog, 
and Log Analyzer) were used in order to monitor 
Eucalyptus’s behavior and log all internal and external 
interactions of the Eucalyptus components. From the log 
information, it is possible to identify crucial information 
such as the IP address of the attacking machine, browser 
type, information on the number of HTTP requests, and 
content requested. Besides these, the number of VMs 
controlled by a single Eucalyptus user can also be 
identified. Their experimental results show that cloud 
forensics would be advanced if the CSPs could provide a 
better logging mechanism.  
 Sang also proposed a log-based model that is only 
suitable for the SaaS and PaaS models [13]. This solution 
aims to keep a separate log in the consumer side locally 
and synchronize it with the CSP logs using information 
such as unique IDs and time-stamps. Hence, it enables 
investigators to check user activities on SaaS without the 
CSP’s support. However, the log content is decided by the 
CSP to ensure comparability. Furthermore, in order to 
guarantee the authenticity of log data, an incremental 
Hash code is used to improve the efficiency and to reduce 
the time for verification. In PaaS, a customized log 
module can be supplied to the third party for both the 
consumer and the cloud provider.  
Damshenas et al. suggested that it is important to 
identify potential evidence only from the client side. Thus, 
designing and configuring built-in application logs is 
required in order to log potential evidence such as user 
communication logs [23]. In SaaS, it can be helpful to 
implement the feature to check the basic logs and the 
status of the client’s usage. However, they did not provide 
any details on how this application could be implemented. 
Marty devised a framework for recovering logging 
information during an investigation in a standardized 
manner: when, where, and what to log [24]. After 
enabling logging on all infrastructure components to 
collect logs, a synchronized, reliable, bandwidth-efficient, 
and encrypted transport layer is established to transfer 
logs from the source to a central log collector. According 
to this proposal, only a minimum number of fields are 
required to be presented for every log, including the time-
stamp record, application and users, session ID, severity, 
reason, and categorization. This proactive approach 
provides assurance to forensic investigators that the data 
are reliably generated and collected. However, this 
framework does not deal with volatile data, which may 
contain potential evidence. 
An encrypted logging model that logs data and then 
sends them to a central logging server under the control of 
the customer was proposed by [20]. They suggested that a 
mechanism that prevents potential eavesdroppers from 
viewing and changing the content of a log during the 
transmission process is required. They also proposed that 
the CSP could provide the network, process, and access 
logs through a read-only API to get the necessary logs 
from all three cloud-service models. 
 Volatile data 
When the power is turned off, volatile data cannot be 
sustained. Likewise, when a VM is turned off or restarted, 
all the data stored in the RAM will be lost unless the 
image is stored somewhere. RAM might contain valuable 
evidence including user-name, passwords and encryption 
keys. Due to the increase in the size of RAM and the 
increase in the use of data encryption, live data forensics 
is becoming increasingly important [25]. Unfortunately, 
the existing infrastructure of CSPs does not provide 
persistent storage for the customer. Although IaaS has 
some advantages over SaaS and PaaS, volatile storage can 
be a problem unless the data is synchronized in persistent 
storage. Thus, volatile data that resides within the virtual 
environment (including registry entries and temporary 
Internet files) are likely to be lost when the IaaS’s 
customer restarts their machine [12],[26], [27],[19]. If the 
inspected cloud-hosted VMs do not have persistent 
storage, the only option to conduct an inspection and 
analysis is the live forensic approach [28].  
Damshenas et al. proposed a solution that provides 
persistent storage for the client’s data. This extra storage 
can be utilized in data-recovery, in data-safety for the 
client, and it can ease the data collection for investigators. 
For this reason, it should be globalized between CSPs in 
order to provide the clients with persistent storage. 
However, it is not common for small- and medium-sized 
business organizations to employ this option due to the 
cost issue. 
Furthermore, Birk and Wegener proposed a solution to 
overcome the problem posed by volatile data [20]. They 
suggested continuous data synchronization of the volatile 
data between the VM and the persistent storage. However, 
this approach did not provide any guidelines or practical 
implementation suggestions for the procedures. 
 Lack of control of the system 
The lack of control over the system poses a number of 
obstacles to digital investigators when they carry out 
evidence acquisition [29]. Indeed, consumers have varied 
and limited access and control at all levels within the 
cloud environment and have no knowledge where their 
data are physically located [7]. To elaborate, a tenant 
administrator has more control over Infrastructure as a 
Service (IaaS) model and the level of control diminishes 
as we go towards SaaS model (as shown in Fig 1). This 
effectively removes the opportunity to perform a physical 
acquisition of the disk, which is a standard practice in 
computer forensic investigations. Moreover, the 
investigator has to obtain vital information from 
abstracted resources in order to accurately understand the 
environment including the cloud architecture, hardware, 
hypervisor, and file system. Unfortunately, in today’s 
cloud architecture, such information is not yet available to 
the cloud consumer [17]. 
 
Fig. 1 Customer Control with Different Service Models 
  Lack of customer awareness 
A lack of CSP transparency along with little international 
regulation leads to loss of important terms regarding 
forensic investigations in the Service Level Agreement 
(SLA). This issue is applicable to all three service models 
[30]. 
2.2 Data Collection and Preservation Stage  
Data collection is the core functionality in a digital 
investigation. It is undertaken to collect artefacts of digital 
evidence and supporting material that are considered of 
potential value. It ensures that original artefacts are 
preserved in a way that is reliable, complete, accurate, and 
verified [31]. However, several issues exist when 
investigators conduct this step in cloud-based 
investigations, and they are listed below: 
 Dependence on cloud forensic providers 
Both customers and investigators are heavily dependent 
on the CSP in terms of collecting the digital evidence 
from the cloud-computing environment, as they have 
limited control over the system. This dependence 
introduces serious issues surrounding trust in the CSP and 
evidence integrity. Furthermore, technically there are 
many reasons that prevent a CSP from providing the 
consumer with the desired evidence in a forensically 
sound manner and in a timely fashion. These include, but 
are not limited to: 
i. Due to the sheer volume of data and users within the 
cloud environment, most CSPs will only keep a limited 
number of backups. This can cause problems when 
recovering deleted data or even overwritten data that 
have been deleted by another user.  
ii. CSPs usually hide the data location from customers for 
data movement and for replication reasons [30].  
iii. In case of an incident, the cloud provider will focus on 
restoring the service rather than preserving the evidence 
and handling it in a forensically sound manner. 
Furthermore, some CSPs may not report the incident or 
cooperate in an investigation due to the potential damage 
to their reputation.  
iv. CSPs do not hire certified forensic investigators to 
handle cloud-based incidents in a forensically sound 
manner. Hence, the integrity of evidence could be 
questioned in a court of law [32]. 
v. The location uncertainty of the data makes the 
response time to an e-discovery request extremely 
challenging [9]. 
vi. Ultimately, as for evidence residing in one CSP, this 
could lead to a single point of failure and adversely impact 
on the acquisition of useful data [33]. However, 
Investigators may face the issue of cascaded services in 
situations where one CSP depends on another [25]. 
Fundamentally, the CSP architecture is designed for 
operational considerations to provide the most effective 
use of resources in the most economical fashion. As a 
result, it is not designed with forensic acquisition and 
analysis in mind. Currently, cloud customers and 
investigators have to completely rely on the CSPs to 
provide digital evidence through centralized 
administration and management [34]. The lack of 
transparency between the CSPs and customers might 
affect their trust relationship.  
Ko et al. proposed a detective model called 
TrustCloud, which consists of five layers of accountability 
including system, data, workflow, policies, and 
regulations [35]. Furthermore, Dykstra and Sherman 
proposed a six-layer model for IaaS based on the amount 
of trust required: guest application, guest operating system 
(OS), virtualization, host OS, physical hardware, and 
network cloud layer. The further down the stack is, the 
less cumulative trust is required. For example, a guest 
application requires trust from all of the aforementioned 
layers, whereas the network layer only needs trust in the 
network [36]. Ultimately, they recommended a cloud-
management plane for use in the IaaS model in such a 
way that customers and investigators can collect vital 
digital evidence including VM images and logs of 
networks, processes, and databases. However, this 
approach needs an extra level of trust in the management 
plane. Dependence on CSP is still a serious issue unless 
the providers offer customers tools or applications that 
forensically collect their data. From a forensic 
investigation perspective, a better result of 
investigation can be achieved through solutions that are 
designed with forensics in mind. On the contrary, the 
industrial point of view is that forensic requirements 
should have no effect on the architecture of 
environment that might or might not be investigated. 
However, if such requirements would protect public 
security, governments might encourage CSPs to set up 
forensic capabilities while designing cloud 
architectures [25]. The leading cloud providers have just 
started embracing such concept. For example, Amazon 
has recently released CloudTrail logging application that 
allows the logs to be retrieved using Amazon Web 
Services (AWS) portal and delivers log files to an 
Amazon Simple storage Services (S3) bucket that 
customer specified [37]. Although, this application was 
designed solely for security purpose, it might provide 
potential forensic data for Amazon users. However, AWS 
CloudTrail needs third party tools in order to process 
analysis and aggregation of log files. Thus, more level of 
trust is still needed [38].  
 Isolating a cloud instance 
For any forensic process, it is vital to isolate the incident 
environment in order to prevent any possible evidence 
from being tampered with, altered, or adulterated. Hence, 
the particular instance that is connected with the incident 
in the cloud environment needs to be isolated. However, 
 achieving such a task in the cloud environment is not a 
trivial undertaking due to the data instance sharing storage 
with multiple instances.  
Furthermore, a single cloud node can contain several 
instances and the nodes have to be cleared when 
performing a digital investigation. Some cloud-isolation 
techniques were proposed by [39] that can be used to 
isolate these cloud instances and mitigate the issue of 
multi-tenancy in cloud computing. The goal is to prevent 
any contamination or tampering with the evidence while 
forensic investigations are undertaken in the cloud 
environment. These techniques involve instance 
relocation, where an incident can be moved inside the 
cloud. The movement can be manually carried out by the 
cloud administrator or can be performed automatically via 
the OS. Server farming can be used to re-route the request 
between user and node. The last technique is to place 
isolating evidence in a Sandbox. In order to obtain a better 
result, a combination of these techniques should be 
implemented. However, these techniques are mainly 
theory-based without the support of practical 
experimentation. 
 Data provenance in the cloud 
Provenance plays a major role in the success of data 
forensics in cloud computing. Implementing secure 
provenance enables the digital investigators to obtain vital 
forensic data from the cloud environment, such as 
defining who owns the data at a given time, and when, 
and by whom the data were accessed. Furthermore, it 
maintains the chain of custody as it provides the time-line 
of evidence. Li et al. proposed the need for a secure 
provenance in cloud computing that records ownership 
and the process history of data objects in cloud computing 
[40]. They stated that such techniques should satisfy 
conditional privacy preservation. The technique also 
provides confidentiality for sensitive documents stored in 
a cloud, anonymous authentication for cloud servers, and 
provenance tracking of disputed documents. Cloud-
computing features were utilized in order to reduce the 
user’s overheads during the process of provenance [40]. 
They claim that the proposed solution provides trusted 
evidence in the cloud environment. However, their 
solution has not been applied to particular service model. 
 Data integrity 
One of the main issues faced by investigators in cloud-
based cases is ensuring evidence integrity by preserving 
the integrity of the original data [32]. Data integrity is a 
critical component of the forensic process [7]. It is crucial 
that the original evidence is not changed at all [19]. A 
piece of incident-related information has to be listed in the 
chain-of-custody register in order to maintain the integrity 
of the digital evidence, including how, where, and by 
whom the evidence was collected, how the evidence was 
stored and preserved, along with any related details of 
procedures that have been carried out [23]. The improper 
preservation of evidence might mean that the evidence 
becomes valueless in a court of law [29]. However, it is 
likely that errors will occur in the data-preservation stage 
in the cloud context due to the multiple actors who are 
involved in the process [12]. Thus, it is a challenging task 
to prove the integrity of cloud-based evidence to a court in 
an admissible manner [12]. For example, if the client was 
involved with the malicious activities, she can claim that 
her authentication credentials were stolen, and might have 
been misused by somebody else. Yet, it is difficult to 
evaluate the authenticity of that claim [35].  
With the aim of preserving the integrity and 
confidentiality of the data within the cloud environment, a 
trust platform module (TPM) was proposed [20],[36]. 
Using the TPM leads to the preservation of the integrity 
and confidentiality of the data. Furthermore, utilizing 
TPM solutions provides machine authentication, hardware 
encryption and signing, secure key storage, and attestation 
[12]. Besides this, it can provide the integrity when 
running a virtual instance, trusted log files, and the trusted 
deletion of data to customers [12]. However, the security 
of the TPM is still questionable due to the possibility of 
modifying a running process without it being detected by 
the TPM [36]. In the near future, CSPs are unlikely to 
comply with the TPM as most of the current devices are 
not compatible [12].  
Furthermore, in order to authorize the client and 
ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the evidence, 
multi-factor authentication methods and cryptographic 
tunneling protocols such as a virtual private network 
(VPN) can be used together to simply mitigate the 
preservation issue [23]. As security is a major concern in a 
cloud environment, researchers have proposed an 
encryption mechanism to ensure end-user security. While 
this can increase the complexity of the investigation, it can 
also be advantageous for investigators. For example, the 
deployment of the public key infrastructure (PKI) would 
be used to track down a particular suspect. It is also 
suggested that an SLA should contain all of the client’s 
privacy data.  
Yan proposed a framework that images the relative 
records and files completely [41]. Furthermore, a 
litigation hold or similar freezing mechanism is required 
to be placed by the CSP on the account to prevent any 
changes to the data [28]. For example, law-enforcement 
agencies in Australia can give preservation notices to the 
CSPs according to the Australian Cybercrime Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2011 [42]. 
 Time synchronization 
The synchronization of time (stamps) is very important, as 
it can be used as a source of evidence. Nevertheless, the 
data date-stamps and time-stamps are questionable when 
they are from multiple systems [12]. Moreover, the 
difference in time zones between cloud servers and cloud 
 clients can affect the integrity, reliability, and 
admissibility of evidence.  
Currently, the cloud infrastructure is strongly 
dependent on whether the VM guest’s OS is using a 
network protocol to synchronize with a network time 
server. However, the best strategy recommended by [43] 
is to obtain the time from many servers and keep the most 
common time value from them. 
Furthermore, using a specific time system such as 
GMT on all entities of the cloud can be helpful in 
providing a logical time pattern in the way that it enables 
investigators to create the time-line analysis and to track 
multiple log records in different physical locations [23].In 
Addition, a consistent time source such as Network 
Timing Protocol (NTP) can identify the sequence of 
evidence and create the time-line analysis of events across 
CSP and the network [25]. 
 Cloud literacy of investigators 
Few training materials are available that could be utilized 
to educate investigators on cloud-computing technology 
and cloud forensic procedures. Additionally, current 
digital forensic training materials are not updated 
regularly, nor do they address the major challenges of 
cloud environments. Moreover, there is a lack of standard 
operating policies for cloud forensics [30]. It is essential 
for members of an investigation team to be trained on the 
legal regulations, the special tools, and the techniques, 
including programing, networking, communication, and 
negotiation with CSPs [44]. 
 Chain of custody 
The chain of custody is one of the most critical problems 
in the digital forensic arena [12]. The chain of custody has 
to illustrate how the evidence was collected, analyzed, and 
preserved with the aim of presenting the evidence in an 
admissible way in a court of law [17].  
It is difficult to verify the data chain of custody in the 
cloud environment due to the unique combinations of 
characteristics that cloud computing has, including its 
distributed and multi-layered nature [34]. In order to 
maintain the chain of custody, certain things need to be 
clarified, such as the way in which logs were collected, 
generated, and stored, along with who had access to the 
logs. Moreover, CSPs have to hire trained and qualified 
specialists [45]. Furthermore, communication and 
collaboration related to all forensic activities through the 
chain of CSPs and the customer’s dependencies need to be 
clearly written in SLAs [30]. 
2.3 Analysis and Examination Stage 
It is very challenging to conduct a proper analysis in the 
cloud due to the sheer volume of resources and vast 
number of objects to be examined during a digital 
investigation, along with limitations in the processing and 
examining tools. Moreover, there is no standard program 
for the forensic extraction of data, as the customer can 
access relevant data from various devices such as a 
desktop PC, tablet, or mobile phone, and from a wide 
range of applications. Furthermore, the data-extraction 
format varies based on the service model. For example, in 
the IaaS model, investigators can obtain an image of the 
VM that contains all data uploaded by a suspect. 
However, the data would be exported in an unstructured 
fashion, creating difficulties in reading, examining, and 
analyzing the data format using standard forensic tools. 
Thus, it is important to develop utility applications that 
translate the native cloud data format into a readable and 
recognizable format by the tools [10].  
A reconstruction of the events of the forensic 
investigation produces crucial and valuable analysis in 
order to logically recreate the crime. However, due to the 
distributed and shared nature of the cloud, each event 
relating to the crime might occur in a different country. 
This will lead to difficulties in deducing the logical order 
regarding where the event took place.  
Investigators can face a wide range of challenges when 
they perform the examination and analysis stage, 
including: 
 Lack of available cloud forensic tools 
It is a common understanding that the available forensic 
tools have various limitations and cannot cope with the 
distributed and elastic characteristics of cloud computing 
[30],[19],[45]. According to survey conducted by [46], 
participants agreed that there is a lack of forensic tools 
that tailored for cloud system. Approximately 58% of 
respondents agreed that digital forensic process 
automation is needed to tackle future challenges including 
cloud forensics. Additionally, there is a high level of 
demand on the forensic-aware tools for the CSP and the 
clients to conduct a forensic investigation in the cloud 
environment [30]. Hence, it is crucial to develop tools 
which can be utilized to identify, collect, and analyze 
cloud forensic data [18].  
A combination of computer forensic and network 
forensic tools is needed in order to acquire forensic data 
and then analyze them in a timely fashion. Traditional 
forensic tools can be used to collect the active data while 
their integrity is preserved. Network forensic tools can be 
utilized to collect additional data over the network 
including activity logs [1]. E-discovery refers to any 
process in which electronic data are sought, located, and 
secured with the aim of using them later in a legal case. In 
the cloud-computing environment, e-discovery can be 
helpful to conduct offline investigations on a particular 
computer or network. For example, Encase software has 
launched their own e-discovery suite; nevertheless, the 
multi-jurisdiction problem is still a major concern [47].  
In cloud computing, it is less likely that CSPs will 
obey the legal e-discovery obligations due to technical, 
cost, and legal reasons, or even due to a lack of capability 
 in terms of preserving the original metadata as expected 
[10]. Furthermore, the response time to an e-discovery is 
extremely challenging due to uncertainty regarding the 
data location and the need for assurance in terms of 
completion of the request [34].  
The open-source software, Offline Windows Analysis 
and Data Extraction (OWADE), was developed and 
launched at the BlackHat 2011 Security Conference by 
researchers from Stanford University in California. This 
software has the ability to find out which website a user 
has visited, extract information stored in the cloud, 
reconstruct Internet activities, and search for the online 
identities that were used. This version is still under 
development and it only works for Windows XP drives 
[48].  
Furthermore, the management plane was 
recommended as the appropriate forensic tool for 
acquiring cloud-based data [36]. They claimed that the 
management plane offers the most attractive balance 
between speed and trust. Despite the fact that some 
commercial tools (e.g. Encase and FTK) can be used to 
successfully acquire evidence, Dykstra et al. do not 
recommend them due to the high level of trust they 
require [36].  
Recently, Dykstra et al. developed a management-
plane forensic toolkit called Forensics Open-Stack Tools 
(FROST), which is designed to acquire forensic data from 
virtual disks, API logs, and guest firewall logs [7]. It 
operates on the cloud-management plane instead of 
interacting with the OS inside the guest VMs. FROST is 
the first forensic tool that has been built into any IaaS 
cloud model [7]. Table 1 illustrates a summary of most of 
the tools used to conduct extraction and analysis within 
cloud environment. 
 Evidence correlation across multiple sources 
Correlation of activities across multiple sources can be 
overwhelming. The evidential resources are spread across 
multiple digital resources. Handling data evidence from 
multiple sources introduces a problem for investigators. 
 Crime-scene reconstruction 
It is crucial to reconstruct the crime scene in order to 
understand how illegal activities were committed. 
Unfortunately, this could be a problem in the cloud 
environment [12]. For example, when an adversary shut 
down her virtual instance after committing certain  
 
Table 1 Summary of current digital forensic tools utilized in the cloud 
Utilized tools General/cloud-Based tools Functionality Reference 
FTK Remote Agent General Remote Acquisition [36] 
Encase Remote Agent General Remote Acquisition [36] 
Snort General Log all internal and external 
interactions and monitor 
Eucalyptus’s behavior 
[21] 
FROST Cloud-Based Digital forensics tools for the 
OpenStack cloud platform 
[7] 
OWADE Cloud-Based What websites a user has visited 
and whether they have any data 
stored in the cloud 
[48] 
CloudTrail Cloud-Based Logging in the AWS Cloud [37] 
Wireshark General Examines network captures [49] 
Sleuthkit General Examines forensic images of hard 
disk and recover files from them. 
[50] 
FTK Imager General Acquisition of memory and disk 
image 
[25] 
X-Ways General Acquisition of live system 
( window & Linux) 
[51] 
Encase e-discovery suite General Offline investigations on a 
particular computer or network 
[47] 
malicious activities, reconstruction of the crime scene will 
be impossible. However, a regeneration event can be used 
where a snapshot is taken to note the occurrence of every 
attack. Geethakumari and Belorkar proposed a method 
allowing investigators to replay the event of the attack and 
restore the system to the state before the attack by using 
snapshots [52]. Ultimately, it is also suggested that 
 incoming and outgoing data through the cloud will be able 
to be visualized by the investigators. 
2.4 Presentation Stage 
The final step of a digital forensic investigation is 
presentation, where the evidence has to be presented to a 
judicial body in the form of a report or testimony [53]. 
Several challenges lie in this step in the context of cloud 
forensics. For instance, it is not clear how to specify the 
physical location of the cloud-based crime due to 
distributed and shared resources between multiple clients 
who are based in different countries. This in turn confuses 
the investigators in terms of determining under which 
legal system the case should be heard. Furthermore, it is 
necessary for digital investigators to explain the 
technicalities to the jury as to how the evidence was 
acquired and what it represents. However, the 
technicalities of a cloud-data center, running thousands of 
VMs, accessed simultaneously by hundreds of users, are 
very hard to be comprehended by a jury member who is 
likely to have only a basic technical knowledge [19]. 
3 Discussion of Current Solutions in the 
Cloud 
The literature has been analyzed by counting the related 
studies per stage of digital investigation (discussed in 
section 2). This review was based on a number of most 
related scientific papers since the term of Cloud 
Forensics was first introduced in 2010. These studies 
have retrieved from well-known academic databases 
including ACM, IEEE Xplore, Springer, and 
ScienceDirect. The majority of studies have addressed 
only the cloud forensics challenges and issues. Several 
studies have proposed solutions for these challenges in 
order to perform proper forensics in the cloud 
environment. Despite this, the majority of these proposals 
are conceptual and not tested in real conditions. There was 
only one piece of research that evaluated and examined 
the current tools used in conducting remote data 
acquisition. This research was conducted by Dykstra and 
Sherman, who developed a set of tools known as FROST. 
So far, traditional tools such as Encase and FTK are still 
the common tools that are heavily utilized in acquiring the 
evidence from the cloud—despite the difference between 
the cloud infrastructure and traditional computer 
environments.  
FROST operates on the cloud-management plane 
instead of interacting with the OS inside the guest VMs. 
FROST is the first forensic capability to be built into any 
IaaS cloud model. However, FROST is deployed by the 
CSP. Thus, trust in the CSP is still required, but not in the 
guest machine. Furthermore, trust in the cloud 
infrastructure is required, including the hardware, host 
OS, hypervisor, and cloud employees. It also assumes that 
the cloud customer is cooperative and involved in the 
investigation. This work involved performing three 
experiments to acquire forensic data from three different 
layers; namely, the guest OS, the virtualization layer, and 
the host OS. All three experiments have succeeded in 
performing data acquisition remotely from the cloud-
based layer. However, a certain amount of trust is still 
highly required in each layer. 
Customers and investigators depend on the CSP to 
perform data acquisition. Some researchers have 
suggested solutions that would mitigate the issue of the 
dependence on the CSP, such as the cloud-management 
plane or APIs, which are provided to the customer in 
order to get forensic hard disk and temporary registry logs 
to acquire data. However, there is various and crucial 
forensic data that still resides in the CSP, including 
deleted files and relying upon CSP cooperation is 
inevitable. In turn, many other issues associated with the 
dependence on the CSP evidence have been highlighted, 
and they are not yet resolved. Such issues include trust, 
delay response, inadmissibility of evidence, and a 
potential single point of failure. 
Amazon, however, has started delivering services that 
support digital forensics by releasing CloudTrail logging 
application. This application was designed for security 
purpose. Despite this, it might provide prime piece of 
information data for Amazon users. However, one more 
level of trust on the management console application is 
still required.   
Furthermore, piecing together a sequence of events 
from multiple sources and different jurisdictions is 
another major obstacle faced by investigators in the cloud 
environment. So far, investigators have no valid approach 
with which to reconstruct the past state of an event with a 
level of accuracy so that the reconstructed information can 
be admissible in a court of law.  
It is understood that there is a big concern with regard 
to data acquisition and its integrity in the cloud 
environment. Furthermore, several difficulties associated 
with logging data have still not diminished. These include 
the time-line, log review, logging correlation, and log 
policy monitoring.  
Ultimately, legal issues hinder the smooth performing 
of forensic investigations due to the lack of guidelines and 
implementation of a global standard to overcome the 
cross-border issue.  
To conclude this section, Table 2 illustrates cloud 
forensic challenges and their current potential solutions. 
All proposed solutions were identified from the review 
conducted in the respective domain. Table 3 summarizes 
the open problems that need to be resolved.  
However, it has become necessary to identify a 
solution that will overcome open problems and that would 
allow the forensic acquisition and analysis of systems 
within the cloud [54]. While other research has proposed 
an IaaS solution, it is essentially dependent upon VM 
images being collected and stored, with credence being 
placed on the inclusion of the CSP as central to the 
 solution, thereby ensuring the collection of cloud-
management information [7]. CSPs have little motivation 
to provide assistance with incidents and habitually do not 
let their customers look behind their “virtual curtains” 
[23]. They will only cooperate with an investigation of an 
incident when forced to do so by law-enforcement 
agencies. Even when they do so, this is dependent on the 
status of the system at that time, for example, whether the 
VM remains active, whether the system has been backed 
up, or whether the data have been overwritten. Therefore, 
a starting point must be that organizations remain in 
control of their data and retain the capability to readily 
forensically undertake an incident analysis/examination of 
their systems in the event that this becomes obligatory. 
The next section presents an on-going project that 
seeks to tackle the issue of dependence on the CSPs by 
developing a forensically-enabled IaaS cloud-computing 
architecture. This research aims to produce an acquisition 
and analysis model that fundamentally shifts 
responsibility for the data back to the data owner rather 
than relying upon the CSPs or a third party. 
Table 2 Current cloud forensic issues and solutions 
Cloud Forensic Challenges/Process Applicability to Service 
Model 
 
Potential Solution Ref 
IaaS PaaS SaaS 
Identification 
Access to the evidence 
√ X X 
 
Eucalyptus framework 
OS and the security log 
[21] 
√ X X A log-based model [13] 
√ √ X Extraction of relevant status data [23] 
X √ X A log-management solution [24] 
√ √ X 
 
An encrypted logging model [20] 
Dependence 
on CSP  
Trust issue 
√ √ X Layers of trust model [36] 
Data acquisition √ √ X TrustCloud [35] 
compliance √ √ √ Cloud-management plane [55] 
 
Logs √ √ √ Service Level Agreement (SLA) [17] 
Lack of customer awareness √ √ √ -- [30] 
 
Volatile data √ √ X Client persistent storage [23] 
√ √ X A continuous synchronization API [16] 
Preservation & Collection 
Data integrity √ √ √ Trust platform module (TPM) [9], [36] 
Time synchronization √ √ √ Unified/specific time system [23] 
Cloud literacy of investigators √ √ √ Developing investigators technical skills [44] 
Chain of custody √ √ √ Trained staff [45], [30] 
Analysis & Examination 
Lack of cloud forensic tools  √ √ X FROST, OWADE [7], [48] 
Presentation 
Jury’s technical comprehension X X X Training [19] 
 Table 3 Summary of high-level open issues 
  
Open Issues 
1 Tackle the dependence on the cloud service providers 
2 Time-line analysis across multiple sources and evidence correlation 
3 Overcome the cross-border issues 
4 Lack of control of the system 
5 Jury’s technical comprehension 
4 A Model for Forensic Acquisition & 
Analysis in the Cloud 
The proposed approach in this research seeks to omit the 
involvement of the CSP, while handing over control of the 
forensic acquisition process to the cloud customer, using an 
agent-based approach that is held in each VM and sending 
the required information to a central Cloud Forensic 
Acquisition and Analysis System (Cloud FAAS). By using 
agent-based acquisition, all cloud-management data (e.g. 
VM start time, stop time) are recorded, and the need for 
lower level data that are only accessible via a CSP is 
omitted, such as physical storage locations for the VM 
data. Further, this innovative approach allows an image to 
be recreated of the VM hard drive at any point in time and 
ensures every file is accessible in its entirety, thereby 
overcoming the current restriction of partially overwritten 
files being inaccessible. Limitations arising from data 
carving and fragmentation are therefore removed and the 
forensic investigator is provided with an increased level of 
insight. 
As Figure 2 illustrates, there are two contributing 
factors: the agent coordinator and the Cloud FAAS. The 
agent coordinator manages agents installed within an 
individual VM system, whereas the Cloud FAAS is the 
central processing point for forensic data:  
i) The agent coordinator: Different agents that hold 
responsibility for various forms of the acquisition. An 
acquisition policy, defined by the cloud customer (from 
here on in referred to as the organization), will be housed 
within the Cloud FAAS and there will be a request to 
enable or disable, which will be achieved by the use of 
different agents. The following agents will be available: 
 Non-volatile memory agent—responsible for 
logically imaging the hard drive associated with 
the VM 
 Volatile memory agent—responsible for logically 
imaging the live memory of the VM 
 Network traffic agent—responsible for logging 
and storing network traffic (both egress and 
ingress) 
 Activity log agent—acquiring system and 
application logs 
Along with the nature/responsibility of the VM, 
organizational requirements will dictate the agent utilized. 
For example, in a 3-tier web application, to avoid the 
replication of the network data store, the network traffic 
agent will only be operated on the web front-end system, 
as the back-end server will communicate with the web 
server. Additionally, the activity log agent is expected to be 
the least used, as information can be generated from the 
other agents. To elaborate, its role will be to provide high-
level log information to an investigator where the overhead 




Fig. 2 A novel model for data acquisition within an IaaS
ii) Cloud FAAS: Forensic acquisition policies for the VMs 
are defined by the access provided to the management 
information, and will influence its effectiveness and 
budgetary implications. The policy is an essential 
component of the approach. Therefore, it is flexible and the 
set of standard templates may be adapted to suit the 
organizational risk assessment. It has been developed with 
the user in mind and is based on standard templates derived 
from server roles—critical systems monitor all changes 
across all agents, whereas those that are less critical will 
incorporate a less granular acquisition approach.  
The interaction between the two contributing factors is 
provided by a communication engine, which facilitates the 
communication by the agent coordinator and the Cloud 
FAAS. This communication is cryptographically secured, 
thereby ensuring data confidentiality and integrity. To 
ensure the continuity of control and data integrity 
throughout the acquisition, the agent coordinator and 
agent manager ensure that image data are forensically 
hashed at all levels, including complete images to files. 
Once completed, the information is stored in the forensic 
image storage.  
The responsibility for managing the overall system lies 
with the forensic manager, including providing an 
interface to the forensic investigator, the ability for the 
investigator to select the system to be analyzed, and the 
timeframe in which that is to be examined. Information 
will be taken from the image repository and the image(s) 
reconstructed using the image reconstruction module; the 
policy will impact upon what data and the extent of their 
granularity is to be reconstructed. Once images have been 
reconstructed, data will be sent to undergo forensic 
examination and analysis. Figure 2 illustrates that industry 
de facto tools, such as EnCase or FTK, will be utilized to 
complete this analysis. To provide a higher level of 
abstraction in comparison to an individual system, and to 
ensure that investigators can understand the relationship 
and flow between systems, a correlation engine and 
visualization component will be provided.  
4.1 Acquisition & data handling 
It is acknowledged that the storage of data could become 
extremely expensive for organizations due to the VM non-
volatile storage range being 100GBs and there being GBs 
of network activity; solutions must address this while 
retaining an acceptable forensic standard.  
 The introduction of a policy-based approach is an 
attempt to mitigate information overload and address this 
concern. Figure 3 shows the two main steps of the 
proposed data-handling approach, with the first step being 
the acquisition of the forensic image of the non-volatile 
memory (i.e. the hard drive as seen by the VM). Operating 
at this logical layer on a VM means it is not possible, nor is 
it permissible due to the nature of the cloud, to map this 
data to a physical drive. As such, step 2 is operationally 
akin to an incremental backup, recording all file system 
changes to the drive. The data clusters of those files are 
also stored, which ensures the forensic value of the data, 
allowing the image reconstruction engine to reproduce a 
forensic image of the drive at any point when required, 
including information on the deletion and overwriting of 
files.  
It is not normally possible to obtain access to deleted 
files; however, this approach overcomes that barrier as the 
files are stored by the system, which, in turn, reduces the 
volume of data communicated and stored as well as 
providing the investigator with full access to deleted files. 
The approach set out in the research is to assist in 
investigating incidents in a relatively short (6-month) 
timeframe; it is not intended to provide a replacement for 
organizational backup of data. The policy will define data 
retention, however, by considering the volume of storage 
required in the Cloud FAAS, and this is likely to be short, 
in terms of weeks or months. A re-image of the drive will 
be essential in the future for computation and storage 
requirements, as illustrated in Figure 3, where it shows the 
changes that have occurred since initial imaging in terms of 
volume and complexity.  
The policy defines many factors, such as frequency of 
reimaging, the granularity of file system changes, 
frequency of volatile memory captures, and resolution of 
the network-traffic captures. There will be an increase in 
demands placed upon agents and the Cloud FAAS, in 
particular the forensic image storage, by higher levels of 
resolution and frequency, and lower granularity of data 
capture. It is possible to minimize the adverse effects on 
the core operation by optimizing the transmission of data 
from the agent coordinator to the Cloud FAAS at times of 
low network usage. However, it is accepted that in the 
absence of the most rigorous policy, the forensic value of 
data will not be impeccable, however, it will be no less 
than that of current forensic systems where there can be a 
direct impact due to the time taken to acquire data 
compared to the point in time the incident occurred. 
The organization has control over the proximity of the 
operation of the Cloud FAAS, although there are 
advantages and disadvantages as to the choice of location. 
If hosted within the same CSP as its operational servers, 
and if running a cloud service in its own right, this could be 
advantageous in terms of having high bandwidth local-area 
connections, yet it would be at risk from being reliant upon 
the flawless running of the CSP. However, the organization 
may choose to host it locally so that ownership and access 
to data are as strong and reliable as possible. A cloud-based 
deployment more generally would certainly be 
advantageous from a data-processing and forensic analysis 
perspective. Both of these aspects are computationally very 
intensive, yet unpredictable as to when they will be 
required. An elastic and flexible computing environment 
would allow for this—whether that is a public or private 
cloud.
 
Fig. 3 File changes at given times 
 4.2 Performance and Scalability Analysis 
Despite the fact that proposed model is still merely 
conceptual, indeed, ensuring the performance of FAAC 
model is a major concern.  Following the development of 
the (FAAS) prototype, a complete system will be evaluated 
against the following issues:  
1- Performance Overhead: collecting the relevant material 
from different systems (VMs) across all agents and send 
them to the FAAS causes the additional overhead. Adding 
such new mechanism can slow down running VMs and 
then affect running services. Furthermore, all 
communication is undertaken in a cryptographically secure 
manner – to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the 
data in transit. The Agent Coordinator and Agent Manager 
also include the forensics hashing of all image data (at all 
levels of data object – complete images to files) to ensure 
chain of custody and data integrity is maintained 
throughout the acquisition phase. This will require some 
techniques such as encryption and hashing which adds 
more workload to the running services as well.  
2- Network Overhead: it is vital to keep network overhead 
to a minimum. However, the volume of data being 
recorded – VMs data and Network activities- and sent via 
network activities resulted in an impact on the network 
traffic.  
3- Granularity: it refers to the level of data which is being 
collected and stored. Although finer level of integrity is 
important to digital investigators, it can affect the level of 
performance overhead.  
4- Quality of Reconstructed Image: the constructed image 
retrieved from Forensics Image Storage must gain 
acceptance from both the judicial and technical 
communities.  
5- Performance of Forensics Analysis: some cases are high 
profile, such as a child abduction, which must be processed 
as quickly as possible in order to provide investigators 
with time sensitive information that may be vital to the 
outcome of the situation. Unfortunately, some of these 
cases can take hours or even days to finish on larger 
evidence. The average amount of data per case, as 
experienced by FBI’s 15 Regional Computer Forensics 
Laboratories, has grown 6.65 times (from 84 GB to 
559GB) in eight years (2003–2011) [56]. Thus, it is 
imperative to reduce the overall processing time of large 
quantities of data by leveraging the power of a high 
performance computing platform and adapting existing 
tools to operate within this environment. 
Ultimately, in order to mitigate aforementioned issues and 
gain a better result, the best balance between the various 
issues has to be taken in account. Thus, developing this 
proposed model, examining and analyzing it with real and 
live data will practicably give better insight about its 
feasibility and value in solving the research problem. 
5 Conclusions and Future Work 
As there are increasing cloud-computing uses, there is a 
growing need for trustworthy cloud forensics. Several 
researchers have identified and explored the challenges 
confronting the digital investigators when they conduct 
forensic investigations in cloud-based cases. Accordingly, 
some researchers have proposed technical solutions to 
mitigate these challenges. However, there are still open 
issues that need to be tackled. 
This paper identified cloud forensic challenges, 
matched proposed solutions to these challenges, and 
determined open problems that need further efforts to be 
tackled. With the on-going success of the ever-expanding 
cloud, it is found that the concern surrounding the integrity 
and acquisition of data must be addressed. It is imperative 
that organizations retain control of data to ensure that they 
can be forensically examined in a timely manner, and 
thereby releasing the CSPs of that burden. The solution 
outlined above can help overcoming the concerns; 
however, further research would provide a greater 
understanding of the technical implications of the day-to-
day operations of a cloud system as well as the financial 
implications arising therefrom. 
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